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Moral Rationalism and Sharia
Cód:
491_9780367870249
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Moral Rationalism and Sharia is the first attempt at outlining the scope for a theological reading of Sharia, based on a critical examination of why Adliyya theological ethics have not significantly impacted Shii readings of Sharia. Within Shii works of Shari a legal theory (usul al-fiqh) there is a theoretical space for reason as an independent source of normativity alongside the Quran and the Prophetic tradition. The position holds that humans are capable of understanding moral values independently of revelation. Describing themselves as Adliyya (literally the people of Justice), this allows the Shi a, who describe themselves as Adiliyya (literally, the People of Justice), to attribute a substantive rational conception of justice to God, both in terms of His actions and His regulative instructions. Despite the Shii adoption of this moral rationalism, independent judgments of rational morality play little or no role in the actual inference of Shari a norms within mainstream contemporary Shii thought. Through a close examination of the notion of independent rationality as a source in modern Shii usul al-fiqh, the obstacles preventing this moral rationalism from impacting the understanding of Shari a are shown to be purely epistemic. In line with the emic (insider) approach adopted, these epistemic obstacles are revisited identifying the scope for allowing a reading of Sharia that is consistent with the fundamental moral rationalism of Shii thought. It is argued that judgments of rational morality, even when not definitively certain, cannot be ignored in the face of the apparent meaning of texts that are themselves also not certain. An Adliyya reading of Sharia demands that the strength of independent rational evidence be reconciled against the strength of any other apparently conflicting evidence, such that independent
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